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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SSO: REPLETE WITH
INTERNAL DEFICIENCIES AND PRACTICAL
DANGERS*
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976,1 the literal elements
of computer programs2 have clearly been subject to copyright protec-
tion.3 Over the last five years, however, courts have shown an increasing
willingness to expand the protection of computer programs beyond their
literal elements. In some jurisdictions, protection has been extended to
the "sequence, structure, and organization" ("SSO")4 and even to the
"display screens" 5 of computer software. At least one commentator has
urged that protection be extended to custom and semi-custom logic
devices.6
* I would like to thank Professor Hugh Hansen for his help in writing this Note,
particularly with respect to the analysis of the Whelan and Lotus decisions.
1. Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1988)).
2. The literal elements of a computer program are the actual instructions contained
in the program.
3. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5667.
4. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix
Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 1989). The sequence, structure and
organization of a program is "the manner in which the program operates, controls and
regulates the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and
producing useful information." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239 (quoting Whelan Assocs., Inc.,
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320 (E.D. Pa.), amended in part,
609 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987)).
5. See, eg., Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 996
(D. Conn. 1989)("plaintiff's screen displays... merit protection as copyrightable expres-
sion"); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 1986)(rejecting "defendant's argument that the overall structure, sequencing, and
arrangement of screens in [the program] fall outside the ambit of copyright protection").
But see Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
449, 455, 463, 465 (N.D. Ga. 1987)(rejecting concept that a program can be infringed
through copying of its display screens, but holding that display screens are separately
copyrightable as a literary work/compilation). Thus, protection of "display screens"
goes beyond SSO protection because it is protection completely divorced from the literal
elements of the program and the program's structure. See generally Note, Copyright Pro-
tection for Computer Screen Displays, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1123-24 (1988)(discussing copy-
right protection of display screens). It should also be noted that the term "display
screen" is often used interchangeably with "user interface."
6. See Lunney, Copyright Protection for ASIC Gate Configurations: PLDs Custom
and Semicustom Chips, 42 Stan. L. Rev 163, 163 (1989). ASICs (Application Specific
Integrated Circuits) are defined by the author as including PLDs (Programmable Logic
Devices), custom and semi-custom chips. See id at 165. PLDs "consist of a paired array
of AND and OR gates .... Custom and semicustom chips have gates configured to
achieve the logic pattern desired by a purchaser." Id. at 168. For a more complete dis-
cussion of ASICs, see generally S. Shiva, Introduction to Logic Design 292-330
(1988)(discussing PLDs, custom logic devices, and other forms of programmable logic).
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This Note argues that the trend towards expanded protection is defi-
cient both in its interpretation of copyright law and in its practical impli-
cations. Part I of this Note briefly discusses the general principles of
copyright law. Part II of this Note discusses existing case law on the
copyrightability of computer programs, both in general and with respect
to the protection of SSO. Part III examines the statutory and practical
bars to SSO protection. Fart IV will demonstrate that literal copyright
protection combined with patent protection is adequate to serve the goals
of intellectual property law.7
I. THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
The power to create copyrights and patents was granted to Congress in
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution.' Congress has exercised this power
through the enactment of various copyright statutes, culminating with
the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Act"). 9
Under Section 102 of the Act, protection "subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .""° This
section additionally defines works of authorship to include literary
works; musical works, including any accompanying words; dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures
and other audiovisual works; and sound recordings." The Act further
provides that computer programs are to be protected under Section 102
as "literary works." 12 In 1980, in response to the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works Report,' 3 the Act
7. Another alternative is to create separate legislation, outside of both copyright and
patent law, to deal with this problem. This course, which may be the most practical, is
nevertheless beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Raskind, Symposium: The Fu-
ture of Software Protection: The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting Com-
puter Software, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1131 (1986)(proposing specific legislation for
protection of computer software).
8. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1988)).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
11. See id.
12. Id. § 102a. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code & Admin. News 5659, 5667 ("The term 'literary works'... includes...
computer programs.").
13. In 1978, after three years of investigation, the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works submitted its final report. See Final Report of
the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (1979)
[hereinafter "CONTU"]. The Commission was formed to review the law of copyright
concerning computer programs and to make recommendations on new legislation. See
id. at 1. The report is generally considered the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright
Act with regard to computer programs. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988)("[C]ourts... rely on the CONTU Report as an expres-
sion of legislative intent."); Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 n.7
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was amended to further define a computer program as "a set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result.' ' 4
Although the Act grants copyright protection to computer programs,
Section 102(b) of the Act limits the protection afforded to all works of
authorship by providing that "[i]n no case does copyright protection...
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system [or] method of
operation." 15
To determine whether the non-literal elements of computer programs
fall within the subject matter of copyright as defined by Section 102 of
the Act, three basic doctrines must be examined: the process/expression
dichotomy, the idea/expression dichotomy and the merger doctrine.
The process/expression dichotomy1 6 traces its roots to Baker v. Sel-
den.17 In that case, the plaintiff had written a book explaining a new
(D. Mass. 1984)(CONTU has been considered an expression of legislative intent); Mid-
way Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(same); Note, Idea,
Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the
Structure of Computer Programs, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 866, 886 (1990)("[S]everal courts have
considered the CONTU Report a reflection of legislative intent-even with respect to the
1976 Act."); Comment, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer Software: An
Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 977, 984
(1988)(courts look to CONTU for legislative history). But see Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1242 (3d Cir. 1986)(CONTU is legisla-
tive history only as to those provisions amended in response to the Report), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
Unfortunately, the report does not explicitly address the protection of non-literal ele-
ments of computer programs. It does, however, discuss the difficulty in distinguishing
between process and expression. See CONTU, supra, at 22; Note, supra, at 888; infra note
16 and accompanying text.
Due to the absence in this discussion of anything remotely resembling the protection of
SSO, it could be argued that the Commission did not envision such protection. One
author noted that "[o]ne view is that CONTU did not contemplate that the copying of
anything other than literal instructions could ever constitute copyright infringement."
Note, supra, at 888. The author went on to assert that "[a]n alternative interpretation is
that CONTU never expressed a view on whether program structure should be pro-
tected." Id. at 889.
Regardless of whether CONTU implicitly rejected SSO protection or was merely am-
biguous as to its protection, there are far more important reasons to reject non-literal
protection. See infra notes 50-85 and accompanying text.
14. Pub. L. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988)). In addition, Congress amended Section 117 of the Act in response to the
CONTU Report. See id (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988)). A discussion
of Section 117, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
15. Pub. L. 94-553, § 102(b), 90 Stat. 2544 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)). It should be noted that this preclusion existed at common law prior to the
Act's passage. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42
(9th Cir. 1971); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930),
cert denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). This preclusion is discussed more fully later in this
Note. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
16. See Note, supra note 13, at 876; see also CONTU, supra note 13, at 22 (discussion
of the process/expression distinction).
17. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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system of accounting that he had devised. 8 Within the book were sam-
ple forms with which to use this method of accounting. 9 The defendant
produced a similar form that was designed to be used with this system of
accounting.2" The Court held that although the plaintiff's system of ac-
counting could not be protected, his book describing the system could be
protected.2" Therefore, an expression of a process is copyrightable, but
the process itself is not.22
Similarly, the idea/expression dichotomy posits that only the expres-
sion of an idea can be protected, not the idea itself.23 It is thus necessary
to determine how much of the material sought to be protected is idea and
how much is expression.24 The dichotomy has been developed mostly
with regard to the plots of literary works, where the plot of the infringing
work is sufficiently similar to the copyrighted work to constitute a copy-
ing of expression. The judgment is generally made on a case-by-case ba-
sis using Judge Learned Hand's levels-of-abstraction test.25
The merger doctrine holds that where an idea can be expressed in only
one way, there can be no protection of the expression because to protect
the expression would be to protect the idea.26 These three doctrines pro-
vide the guidelines for analyzing SSO protection.
II. THE CASE LAW
A. The Early Cases-Protection of the Literal Elements
The early cases involving computer programs under the Act dealt only
with literal copying of computer code. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frank-
18. See id. at 99-100.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 100.
21. See id. at 103-104.
22. See id. at 104-05.
23. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d
738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
24. Because computer programs are defined as literary works under the Act, many
courts have attempted to define the "expression" of computer programs by adopting tests
developed for determining the expression of novels. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233-34 (3d Cir. 1986)(making an anal-
ogy between non-literal elements of books and the non-literal elements of computer pro-
grams), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass. 1990)(same).
25. See infra note 38.
26. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th
Cir. 1971); see, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967)("When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that 'the topic neces-
sarily requires,'.., at best only a limited number" of forms of expression, there can be no
copyrighting of the expression)(citations omitted); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
140 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944)(there can be no copyright
protection where "the practical use of the art explained by the copyright and lodged in
the public domain can be attained solely by the employment of language which gives
expression to that which is disclosed").
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lin Computer Corp.,2 7 the court held computer programs copyrightable
regardless of whether they were in source or object code2" and regardless
of whether the programs were application programs or operating system
programs. 29 The court seemed to foreclose the possibility of SSO protec-
tion by stating in dicta that Apple would not be able to "copyright the
method which instructs the computer to perform its operating
functions."3 °
Similarly, in Synercom Technology, Ina v. University Computing Co., "
a district court held that "the sequence and ordering" of input data was
idea rather than expression and therefore unprotectable1 2 This holding
was later relied upon by the Fifth Circuit to deny protection to SSO.aa
Copyright law also extends protection against literal translations from
one computer language to another. In E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp.
ofAm.,4 the court concluded that although the infringing program was
not a line-by-line copy of the original, the fact that the infringing work
was essentially a translation warranted a finding of infringement even
though the plaintiff and defendant used different microprocessors and
thus different assembly languages." None of these cases, however, indi-
cated that protection could extend beyond the literal elements.
B. The Expansion into Protection of Sequence Structure
And Organization
In 1986, copyright protection was extended beyond the literal code to
the "sequence, structure and organization" (SSO) of computer programs
27. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
28. See id at 1249. The source code is the program as written by the programmer in
human readable form. The object code is the original program translated into binary
code (e.g. 10001101) that the machine can understand. See Note, supra note 13, at 869
n.15.
29. See Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1252. An application program is what
most people associate with a computer program. It is a program "run" on a computer
that performs a specific task for the user, such as spread sheet programs and computer
games. An operating system program is what controls the internal functioning of the
computer as a whole. It is essentially a part of the hardware itself and is sometimes
embedded in the hardware in the form of a ROM (Read Only Memory). See Menell, An
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L Rev.
1045, 1048 (1989).
30. Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1251.
31. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
32. See id at 1013-14.
33. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
34. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
35. See id. at 1497. This decision, which dealt with a program embedded in a mobile
radio unit, is also interesting because it extended protection to a program that was inte-
grally related to its hardware environment. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
Another example of protection of this type of program is found in NEC Corp. . Intel
Corp., 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1986), in which the court extended protection to the
"microcode" of an Intel 8086 microprocessor. The microcode is a program that directs
the control section of a microprocessor to interpret or execute instructions. See id. at
592-93.
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by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 36 The court reasoned that because copy-
right law protects non-literal elements in other literary works, such as
the plots of novels, through the idea/expression dichotomy, it should
also protect non-literal elements in computer programs. 37 Whelan inter-
preted the idea/expression dichotomy to mean that "the purpose or func-
tion of... [the] work would be the work's idea, and everything that is
not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression
of the idea ' 38 and therefore protected.
Subsequently, in Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems,
Inc. , the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, without citing Whe-
lan, held that "[w]hether the non-literal components of a program, in-
cluding the structure, sequence and organization and user interface, are
protected depends on whether, on the particular facts of each case, the
component in question qualifies as an expression of an idea, or an idea
itself."'' The court did not, however, adopt the broad standard of Whe-
lan, which declared that only the basic purpose of the program is unpro-
tected. It did not explicitly adopt any test for distinguishing idea from
expression. It noted, however, that several unique features of the plain-
tiff's program supported the proposition that the structure was
"expression." 41
36. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). In this case the
plaintiff, Whelan, was an experienced developer of computer software and the defendant,
Jaslow, manufactured dental prosthetics and devices. Jaslow sought to have his business
operations computerized and hired Whelan to write the software. Shortly after Whelan
developed the program, he decided to market it publicly, and Jaslow became the sales
representative for the Dentalab Program. Jaslow later wrote a program called Dentcom,
which was written in a different computer language than Dentalab and was advertized as
a new version of Dentalab. Jaslow sued for misappropriation of trade secrets and Whelan
counterclaimed for copyright infringement. See id. at 1225-27.
37. This doctrine holds that only the expression of the idea is protected, not the idea
itself. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
38. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (emphasis omitted). The court held that the "idea" of
the Dentalab program was "simply to run a dental laboratory in an efficient way." Id. at
1238 n.34. Therefore, it concluded that the SSO, which was not necessary to this idea,
was protected. The Whelan court's definition of the idea/expression dichotomy should
be contrasted to the more restrictive, albeit less precise, test of Judge Learned Hand that
has served as one of the major tools for distinguishing idea from expression:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of in-
creasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left
out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what
the play is about... but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they
are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of
his "ideas."
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902, 902-03 (1931) [hereinafter "Learned Hand Test"].
39. 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989).
40. Id. at 1175. It should be noted that the court included under the scope of protec-
tion the "user interface." The copyrightability of user interfaces is another hotly disputed
issue in copyright law. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
41. 886 F.2d at 1176.
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The extension of copyright protection to the non-literal elements of
computer programs was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Plains Cotton Cooperative Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv.,
Ina ,42 which, citing a district court case43 that held input formats to be
idea rather than expression, refused to extend protection to SSO. After
noting that the district court case was contrary to Whelan, the Plains
Cotton court stated simply: "We decline to embrace Whelan.""
Despite the Fifth Circuit's rejection of Whelan, the general trend
seems to be towards adoption of SSO protection in some form.4" In
Broderbund Software, Inc v. Unison World, Inc," the District Court for
the Northern District of California declared that "this [c]ourt is per-
suaded by the reasoning of Whelan," which "stands for the proposition
that copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a com-
puter program, but rather that it extends to the overall structure of a
program."'47 In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l," the Dis-
trict Court of Massachusetts, in a long and ultimately confusing opinion,
42. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
43. Id. at 1262 (citing Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462
F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978)).
44. Id
45. See eg., Bull HN Information Sys., Inc. v. American Express Bank Ltd., Copy-
right L. Dec. (CCH) 26,555, at 23,279 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(endorsing Whelan's protection
of SSO); Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elecs., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520, 1524,
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,338, at 22,174 (S.D. Fla. 1988)("Pearl Systems device cap-
tures the 'total concept and feel' of the Competition Electronics subroutines. Copyright
protection of computer software is not limited to the text of the source code or the object
code.")(citations omitted); Healthcare Affiliated Servs., Inc. v. Lippany, 701 F. Supp.
1142, 1150-52 (W.D. Pa. 1988)(endorsing Whelan but denying protection because no evi-
dence of SSO was presented at trial); Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control,
Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,062, at 20,912 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)("I agree with the
Third Circuit's careful analysis in Whelan Associates").
46. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
47. Id. at 1133. In fact, the court in Broderbund read Whelan as extending protection
not only to SSO, but also to the "display screens" of the program. See id. This has
caused concern even for those in favor of SSO protection. One author noted:
the Broderbund court has paved the way for a new and unanticipated applica-
tion of Whelan. Under Broderbund, software designers will not be able to mar-
ket programs which use the same, or a substantially similar, user interface ....
Mhe... decision extended copyright protection to a program's menu screens
without regard for the lack of similarity in the underlying code.
Casenote, Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc- Confusing the "Look" and
the "Feel" of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 2 Software LJ. 113,
121 (1987)(emphasis added); see also Comment, supra note 13, at 992-94(criticizing the
expansion of copyright protection to display screens). But see Note, supra note 5, at 1124
(endorsing copyright protection of screen displays); Note, A Thousand Cloner The Scope
of Copyright Protection in the "Look and Feel" of Computer Programs--Digital Commu-
nications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga.
1987), 63 Wash. L. Rev. 195, 220 (1988)(same). A detailed discussion of the "display
screen" cases is beyond the scope of this Note. The Broderbund decision, however, dem-
onstrates how far things have progressed since Whelan first opened the door to non-literal
program protection.
48. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
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also endorsed the protection of SSO.49
49. In a fifty-page decision, the District Court of Massachusetts held that the "menu
command structure" of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program had been infringed by the
defendant's VP Planner program. See id. at 68-69. The decision is as flawed as it is long.
The court, apparently unfamiliar with copyright doctrine, devoted nearly six pages to a
discussion of useful articles. See id. at 52-58. Computer programs, however, are indispu-
tably defined as "literary works" under the Act, see supra note 12 and accompanying
text, and thus the law on useful articles is completely irrelevant, because it applies only to
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." For a discussion of useful articles, see the
definitions of "useful articles" and "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works," 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988).
Even more distressing, however, was the court's insistence that copyright law imposes
a condition of novelty or non-obviousness. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58-59 (It should be
noted that the court uses the term non-obvious in its lay sense, which is synonymous with
the ordinary meaning of "novelty," and does not attach to it the more specific patent
definition of non-obviousness. See id.; infra note 67). The court was apparently misled
by an errant decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 59 (citing E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enters., Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571, 573
(E.D. Pa. 1954)). No such condition of non-obviousness or novelty exists in copyright.
See, e.g., Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. R.D. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 388 n.8 (5th Cir.
1984)("[n]ovelty is not required in a work in order for the work to be . . . copyright-
able"); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir.
1951)(quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879))("The novelty of the art or
thing described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright."). The
court's intermingling of the concepts of non-obviousness and expression continue
throughout the opinion, ultimately rendering its conclusions doctrinally deficient. See
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65-68.
To its credit, the court, unlike the Third Circuit in Whelan, did attempt to formulate a
test to differentiate idea from expression. Unfortunately, the court's apparent lack of ex-
pertise taints this aspect of the decision as well. The test is formulated as follows:
FIRST .... the court [must] conceive, along the scale from the most generalized
conception to the most particularized,.. . some conception or definition of the
"idea"-for the purpose of distinguishing between the idea and its expression.
Id. at 60 (emphasis omitted). If the idea/expression dichotomy applies to computer pro-
grams, this is a logical first prong for determining its application-it is, in effect, a restate-
ment of the Learned Hand Test. See Learned Hand Test, supra note 38.
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged expression of
the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is one of
only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements
of expression not essential to every expression of the idea.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 61 (emphasis omitted). This prong, again presupposing the appli-
cability of idea/expression, is a valid rewording of the merger doctrine, which merely
states that where a certain element of the idea can be expressed in only one way, that
expression cannot be protected.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential to every expres-
sion of the idea, the decisionmaker must focus on whether those elements are a
substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable "work."
Id. In this third prong, the court's inexperience with copyright doctrine re-emerges.
When determining copyrightability, the amount of the overall work that constitutes ex-
pression is irrelevant because all expression is copyrightable. See Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd.
v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)("A11 that is needed ... is
that the 'author' contributed ... something recognizably 'his own' "). The court is con-
fusing the requirement of an "unlawful appropriation" in order to succeed in an infringe-
ment action with the requirements of copyrightability. See infra note 87 and
accompanying text.
Oddly, having expended much time and effort into developing this test, the court ap-
plied it in a very vague fashion. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 63-70. The court finally
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C. The Internal Deficiencies Of The Whelan Doctrine
Although Plains Cotton wisely refused to extend protection to the SSO
of computer programs, it failed to properly ground its decision in copy-
right doctrine. In fact, neither Plains Cotton nor Johnson Controls ex-
pended much effort in evaluating copyright doctrine. In contrast,
Whelan expended a considerable amount of effort, but its conclusions
have serious shortcomings.
In Whelan, the court attempted to justify SSO protection through the
use of the idea/expression dichotomy,50 analogizing the SSO to the plot
of a book." This approach is problematic, however, because the idea/
expression dichotomy was created to deal with literary works such as
novels and is ill-suited for use in the area of computer programs. The
SSO of a computer program is conceptually closer to a system of ac-
counting, which was held not copyrightable in Baker v. Selden, 2 than to
the plot of a novel. Even if the analogy proposed by Whelan were ac-
cepted, however, the court's application of the idea/expression dichot-
omy is highly suspect.
The court proposed that "the purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that
purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea."53 The
court derived this test from the following passage in Baker v. Selden:
"where the art [Le., the method of accounting] it teaches cannot be
used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate
the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams
are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given to the
public." 54
It is clear from a reading of Baker, however, that this passage sets
forth a rule of exclusion, not inclusion. It is similar to what later devel-
concluded that the "menu command structure" was copyrightable, see id. at 68, and had
been infringed. See id at 84. It is not clear, however, whether the court was holding the
"display screens" (that which appears on the screen), the user interface (what keystrokes,
in what order, implement what functions) or both to be protected. At the end of its
discussion of copyrightability, the court seems to indicate that both, taken as a whole,
constitute expression. See id. at 68. Because all expression is copyrightable under con-
ventional copyright doctrine, one would normally assume that either or both arc copy-
rightable under this decision. Due to the court's inexplicable insertion of a substantiality
requirement (prong 3), however, it is difficult to determine the court's true holding. Cf
Note, Copyright Protection For Computer Language Creative Incentive Or Technological
Threat?, 39 Emory L.J. 1293, 1330-35 (1990)(criticizing Lotus on the grounds that it
constituted an impermissible extension of copyright protection to computer languages).
50. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
51. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234
(3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
52. 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
53. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236(emphasis omitted); see also Yen, A First Amendment
Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept
and Feel", 38 Emory L.J. 393, 413-14 (1989)(criticizing Whelan's interpretation of a pro-
gram's idea).
54. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879)).
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oped into the merger doctrine" because the Court simply stated that if
the accounting form is necessary to practice the system of accounting, it
is not copyrightable. It does not say that everything in Selden's book that
is not necessary to the system of accounting is expression. This is the
result that would be implied by an acceptance of Whelan's interpretation.
Under this interpretation, Selden's book would actually receive more
copyright protection than a corresponding novel because an infringer
must copy significantly more than what is "necessary" to the "purpose"
of a novel to infringe on its plot. 6 Nevertheless, Whelan, adopting this
test, proceeded to declare that the "purpose" of the program at issue was
to "aid in the business operations of a dental laboratory." '57 The court
therefore concluded that anything not essential to this purpose was pro-
tectable expression.5"
Even if one accepts the court's interpretation of Baker, however, its
definition of the purpose of the program is dangerously broad. It is akin
to saying that the purpose of Selden's book was to create a good account-
ing system. Taking this proposition to its logical conclusion, Selden's
system was protectable expression because there is more than one "good"
system of accounting. Clearly, the Court in Baker would not agree with
this proposition.59
III. THE STATUTORY AND PRACTICAL BARS To SSO PROTECTION
A. Section 102(b): The Oft-Ignored Bar To SSO Protection
A significant bar to protection of the SSO of computer programs is
Section 102(b) of the Act, which precludes protection of any "proce-
dure, process, system, [or] method of operation."'  The Judiciary Com-
mittee notes accompanying Section 102(b) state:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright ... extend protection
to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather
55. In fact, in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1971), the court used the Supreme Court's decision in Baker as precedent for the merger
doctrine. See id. at 742. For a discussion of merger, see supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
56. See Learned Hand Test, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
57. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
58. See id. at 1238-39.
59. In fact, Whelan has been criticized even by supporters of SSO protection. "Per-
haps the single virtue of the Whelan rule is that it is easy to apply .... Given the court's
broad conception of the purpose of a program.... almost any particular structure could
be seen as not necessary to that purpose." Note, supra note 13, at 881 (citation omitted);
see also, Note, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 723, 748-49 (1988)(noting that Whe-
lan is in conflict with Baker); Note, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories"
Copyright Protection For Computer Software Structure- What's The Purpose?, 1987 Wis.
L. Rev. 859, 893 (1987)(arguing that Whelan must be "refined" by narrowing its interpre-
tation of the "purpose" of a program).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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than merely to the "writing" expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is
intended . . . to make clear that the expression adopted by the
programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and
that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not
within the scope of the copyright law.
6 1
This seems to preclude protection of the SSO, which is nothing if not the
method of operation of a computer program.62 Returning to Whelan's
analogy between the SSO and the plot of a book, it is clear that nothing
in Section 102(b) would preclude protection of the plot of a novel. The
Whelan analogy between the SSO of a program and the plot of a novel
therefore fails both legally and conceptually. For these reasons, the pro-
tection of SSO through copyright cannot be defended either through stat-
ute or precedent.63
B. The Practical Bars To Protection
1. Inadvertent "Patents" On The Underlying Hardware
Even if one were to ignore the statutory bar of Section 102(b), policy
61. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5659, 5670 (emphasis added).
62. This point has not gone unnoticed. As one commentator observed: "it seems un-
deniable that the structure, sequence, and organization of a computer program is pre-
cisely the kind of subject matter... that the drafters of Section 102(b) [had] ... in mind
when they denied protection to methods of operation, procedures, and processes."
Reichman, Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copy-
right Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 639, 696-97
(1989).
Commentators in support of SSO protection inevitably point to another segment of the
same House Report that states: "Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope
of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate... that the basic
dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged." H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5670. See
Clapes, Silicon Epics and Binary Bards.- Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protec-
tion For Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1493, 1548-49, 1553 (1987). This read-
ing of the legislative history, however, ignores the more obvious conclusion that the
legislators recognized that copyright law at that time did not protect SSO and sought
only to codify this aspect of copyright law in order to keep it that way. It should be
remembered that Section 102(b) was in effect for eight years before any court recognized
protection of the SSO of computer programs. The court in Whelan, while mentioning the
general language of the House Report, completely ignored the language that specilically
related to computer programs. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
63. In an article published shortly after the Whelan decision, one author observed:
Section 102(b)'s implications for the protection of computer programs are crys-
tal clear. You need only contrast section 102(b)'s statement of what copyright
does not protect with the same Act's definition of "computer program," to ap-
preciate how very thin, indeed, is the infringement protection available to com-
puter software.
Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1119,
1125 (1986). Goldstein characterized Whelan as a decision that "may be supportable on
[its] facts [but] construed the copyright concept of 'idea' too literally .... The functions
that Whelan was disposed to characterize as protectable expression are more accurately
characterized as unprotectable ideas." Id. at 1125-26.
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considerations would nevertheless mandate a rejection of SSO protection.
A major flaw in many of the arguments in favor of SSO protection is that
they fail to recognize that the microprocessor has become a major design
element throughout the engineering industry" and therefore that the ex-
pansion of copyright protection will have ramifications well beyond the
computer industry.
The most serious practical problem in protecting the SSO of computer
programs is that such protection will inevitably conflict with patent prin-
ciples with regard to "embedded systems."65 To understand properly the
significance of extending Whelan-type protection to such systems, it is
necessary first to examine the protection afforded to the hardware in
which the program is "embedded." Patent law grants to an inventor of
any "process, machine, composition of matter, manufacture, or any im-
provement thereof" the exclusive rights to the invention for seventeen
years, provided that "the claimed invention is new, useful, and unobvious
over ... previously known subject matter."66
For an invention to be patentable, therefore, it must meet the tests of
novelty and nonobviousness, 6 a much higher standard than that of copy-
right, which is merely originality and fixation.6" This represents a basic
policy that inventions should not be patented unless they meet a certain
qualitative standard.69 Copyright law, in contrast, imposes no qualitative
requirement whatsoever.70
The protection of SSO becomes particularly dangerous when applied
to embedded systems because it blurs the distinction between patent and
copyright law. Several cases involving embedded systems have already
been litigated. For example, mobile radios, 71 "fax" machines,72
64. See, e.g., R. Smith, Electronics: Circuits and Devices 24243 (3d ed. 1987)(the
microprocessor has "completely changed our approach to the design of all kinds of ma-
chines used in work and play, at home and in business, in the factory and in the labora-
tory"); D. McGlynn, Microprocessors, Technology, Architecture, and Applications 22
(1976)(discussing the effect of microprocessors on the electronics industry).
65. For the purposes of this Note, the term "embedded systems" will refer to those
devices that are not commonly associated with "computers" but nevertheless contain
microprocessors and, therefore, computer programs. Typical examples of these include
automobile transmissions, VCRs, TVs, music synthesizers, stereos and industrial equip-
ment. See J. Hayes, Digital System Design And Microprocessors 55 (1984).
66. R. Hildreth, Patent Law: A Practitioner's Guide 5 (1988); see 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1988).
67. See F. Foster & R. Shook, Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks 146 (1989); 35
U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); F. Foster & R. Shook, supra note 67, at 144, 146.
69. See R. Wincor & I. Mandell, Copyright, Patents And Trademarks: The Protec-
tion of Intellectual and Industrial Property 42 (Legal Almanac Series No. 14, 1980).
70. For example, in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., Ltd., 191 F.2d 99
(2d Cir. 1951), the court stated: "All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and
the [copyright] statute is that the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely
trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own.' . .. No matter how poor artistically
the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own." Id. at 102-03 (footnotes omitted).
71. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn.
1985).
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microcode located within microprocessor chips that control the internal
functioning of the devices,7 3 and shot-timer devices used in competitive
pistol shooting74 have all been found to contain copyrightable computer
programs.
In embedded systems, the programs are integrally related to the hard-
ware itself." Therefore, while the hardware itself may not meet the re-
quirements for a patent, a copyright on the SSO of the program
embedded in the hardware could create pseudo-patent protection of the
hardware because that particular hardware configuration must utilize
that particular SSO.76 As a result, the hardware within the embedded
72. See Secure Servs. Technology, Inc. v. Time and Space Processing, Inc., 722 F.
Supp. 1354 (E.D. Va. 1989).
73. See NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
74. See Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elecs., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520, Copy-
right L. Dec. (CCH) 26,338 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
75. At this juncture, it is necessary to explore the relationship between hardware and
software. In most applications, it is possible for the engineer to choose to implement his
design utilizing either hardware, software or a combination of both. Indeed, it has been
noted:
[H]ardware and software are logically equivalent.
Any operation performed by software can also be built directly into the hard-
ware, and any instruction executed by the hardware can also be simulated in
software. The decision to put certain functions in the hardware and others in
the software is [based on] such factors as cost, speed .... reliability, and fre-
quency of expected changes.
A. Tanenbaum, Structured Computer Organization 10 (1976).
Hardware and software are, therefore, interchangeable elements in an engineer's arse-
nal. In most "embedded" systems, they are interdependent elements of the overall device.
See, e.g., McGlynn, supra note 64, at 32 ( When developing a prototype system the "in-
terplay between hardware and software... must be carefully synchronized."); W. Clark,
The Microprocessor and its Application 90 (1978)(the solutions to most design problems
require a combination of both hardware and software).
76. In discussing NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1986), one
author noted that experts for both parties "testified that if the underlying hardware were
the same, the range of expression available to [the programmer] would have been limited
substantially." A. Clapes, Software, Copyright and Competition 127 (1989). Accord
NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1188-89, Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,379, at 22,389 (N.D. Cal. 1989). Thus, experts for both parties admitted that the
hardware and software elements of the device were inextricably intertwined. Clapes,
however, appears to have overlooked the implications of these statements with regard to
embedded systems.
For example, E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D.C.
Minn. 1985), involved a mobile radio that included in its design a microprocessor and its
accompanying software. Id at 1488. The radio as a whole presumably did not meet the
qualitative standard necessary for a patent. The software, however, was entitled to copy-
right protection.
In this case, the court found infringement because the defendant had "translat[ed] the
EFJ code virtually verbatim from Intel [the plaintiff's microprocessor] to Hitachi (the
defendant's microprocessor] code." Id. at 1496. This is consistent with copyright protec-
tion of the literal elements of a program and is a just result because the defendant could
have implemented the processes embodied in the program without copying the plaintiff's
code. If a similar case were to be litigated after Whelan, however, the plaintiff would be
entitled to protection not only against copying of the literal elements of the program, but
also against copying of the SSO of the program. Due to the interdependence between
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system would be protected from copying for the duration of the copy-
right.77 Thus, the copyright protection of SSO could allow inventors to
frustrate one of the aims of patent law, which is to "promote the Progress
of Science,"7" by allowing such copying.7 9
2. Lack of Disclosure and Notice Requirements
The changes in the Act with respect to registration and notice provide
further reason for concern. Under the Act, copyright protection "sub-
sists.., in original works of authorship," meaning that protection begins
at the moment of creation, provided that the work is "fixed" in a "tangi-
ble medium of expression."80 Therefore, the author need not register a
work with the Copyright Office to receive protection. It is necessary only
for an author to register a work before initiating an infringement ac-
tion." Moreover, beginning March 1, 1989, an author was no longer
required to put a notice of copyright on his work. 2
hardware and software in such systems, it would probably be impossible for the defend-
ant to use the plaintiff's unprotected hardware without infringing on the plaintiff's pro-
tected SSO. The doctrine of merger might not act to bar this result because the defendant
need not use either that hardware configuration or plaintiff's SSO to achieve his goal of
creating a mobile radio that, as a whole, functions in an identical manner as plaintiff's
radio. Therefore, plaintiff's SSO is arguably not the only way to express plaintiff's
"idea"-a radio with plaintiff's specifications-and there is no merger. For a discussion
of merger, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
77. The duration of copyright protection is another significant factor to be consid-
ered. Patent law provides the inventor with the right to exclude others from making,
using and selling the invention for seventeen years from the issuance of the patent. See 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1988). Copyright law, on the other hand, provides the author with the
exclusive right to produce and distribute the work for the life of the author plus fifty
years. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302, 303 (1988). Therefore, copyright protection of the SSO
of computer programs may not only inadvertently extend protection to accompanying
hardware but may also provide protection that is significantly longer in duration than
patent protection.
78. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. The patent law requirement that, in order to be patentable, an article be new,
useful and nonobvious, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1988), necessarily provides that inven-
tions that are "obvious... to a person having ordinary skill in the art," 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1988), receive no patent protection and are dedicated to the public, and thus, available
for copying.
Consequentially, it is common industry practice to dissect a competitor's product in
order to copy its desired aspects. Examples of this practice have been referred to in
several cases. See, e.g., E.F Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1489-90 ("Uniden commenced
development of a mobile radio compatible with EFJ's LTR radios and repeaters some-
time in 1984. In the course of developing an LTR-compatible radio, Uniden... disas-
sembled the software found in EFJ's model 8855 and 8800 radios."); NEC Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 645 F. Supp. 590, 592 (N.D. Cal. 1986)(noting similarities in the hardware
configurations).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). A work, however, need not be registered at the time
of the infringement: "a copyright owner who has not registered his [work] can have a
valid cause of action against someone who has infringed his copyright, but he cannot
enforce his rights in the courts until he has made registration." H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 157, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5773.
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
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The provisions with respect to registration and notice enable the crea-
tor of a program to receive copyright protection for his work without
disclosing the work to the public.8 3 In the case of an "embedded system,"
the copyright protection of SSO will therefore result not only in the de
facto protection of previously unprotectable hardware, but also in protec-
tion of the system as a whole without complying with the disclosure re-
quirements of patent law."
In addition, the removal of the notice requirement allows an author to
receive protection without putting the public on notice that the device at
issue is claiming copyright protection. This is not a problem for most
copyrightable works because it is assumed, for example, that a novel is
subject to protection. As technology continues to blur the line between
hardware and software, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
tell what is copyrightable.8 5 A competitor is thus left in the unenviable
83. Copyright law "reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). In all types of
protected works except computer programs, distribution of the work creates disclosure of
its contents. In the area of computer programming, however, distribution is accom-
plished without disclosure. Congress, by allowing computer programs to be considered
literary works, presumably determined that the need to protect software outweighed the
need for full public disclosure. As expansion of the scope of protection is considered by
the courts, however, this balance must be reconsidered. See, e.g., Samuelson, CONTU
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-
Readable Form, 1984 Duke L.J. 663, 705-19 (arguing that disclosure is an important
policy of copyright law and asserting that copyright protection of computer programs
subverts this policy); Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
1037, 1056-57 (1986)(admitting that lack of public disclosure arguably subverts public
policy, but claiming that the Act is concerned with authorship, not disclosure). But see
Raskind, supra note 7, at 1140-41 (asserting that copyright law is not concerned with
disclosure).
84. As support for this proposition, consider a system built by Corporation A in
which the hardware and software are integrally related. See supra note 75. If the device
is patented, Corporation A must fully disclose the device in the patent. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 111, 112 (1988). In return for this disclosure, Corporation A's device will be protected
against copying. In the absence of patent and SSO protection, however, Corporation B is
permitted to copy the device, provided that it does not copy the literal elements of the
device's software. If SSO protection is extended to this device's software, however, Cor-
poration A will be able to prevent copying of both the hardware and software elements of
its device without any disclosure. See supra note 76. Thus, with respect to an unpatent-
able device, Corporation A can receive what is otherwise unattainable with a patentable
device-protection of the entire device without disclosure.
85. An excellent illustration of the "blurring" of the line between hardware and
software is the ASIC, see supra note 6, which one commentator has asserted is copyright-
able. See Lunney, supra note 6. Lunney notes that "[t]o create an ASIC, the designer
writes a set of descriptive statements in either Boolean algebra or a simulator's descriptive
language." Id. at 176. He therefore claims that these statements are within the Act's
definition of a computer program because "[t]hey are a set of statements written to be
used in a computer.., to produce a result, a final gate configuration." Id. at 177. Thus,
by defining an ASIC in terms of the "program" that creates it, copyright protection could
arguably extend to custom and semi-custom logic devices. An engineer in the industry,
however, would never imagine that such a device could be subject to copyright protection
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position of having to guess what portions of a device are protected.
IV. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF A PROGRAM'S LITERAL
ELEMENTS COMBINED WITH PATENT PROTECTION OF A
PROGRAM'S STRUCTURE Is ADEQUATE
The pitfalls of protecting SSO through copyright can be avoided by
allowing patent law to protect any program structure that meets the pat-
ent requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.86 Copyright protection,
which extends to all programs, should be limited to the program's literal
elements. All programmers, therefore, would receive protection against
literal copying, while only those programers whose work meets the quali-
tative standards of patent law would receive protection of their work's
structure. The remainder of this Note will be devoted to exploring, first,
the scope of copyright protection for the program's literal elements, and
second, the scope of patent protection for the program's structure.
In order to comprehend the scope of literal copyright protection it is
necessary to understand the distinction between copyrightability and in-
fringement. All expression is copyrightable. Copyright protection there-
fore subsists even in a small portion of code. In order to sustain an
infringement action, however, one must prove "ownership of a valid
copyright and unauthorized copying of protected material ... that goes
so far as to constitute unlawful appropriation."87 The literal copying of a
small portion of a program can therefore support a copyright infringe-
ment action if the amount of code copied constitutes the heart of the
work.88
In addition, the literal protection of a program includes the literal
translation of a program from one computer language to another.a9 This
level of protection, combined with the protection of patent law, is ade-
quate to serve the goal of intellectual property law, which is to "promote
and would assume that, because the device had no patent notice, he was free to copy it.
See also Mislow, Computer Microcode: Testing the Limits of Software Copyrightability, 65
B.U.L. Rev. 733, 740 (1986)(discussing the copyrightability of computer microcode).
86. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
87. W. Patry, Latman's The Copyright Law 191 (6th ed. 1986)(emphasis added).
Three distinct elements must be shown to succeed in an infringement action. The first,
ownership of a valid copyright, has been the focus of this Note. The second element,
copying, can be shown either directly (i.e., plaintiff produces a witness who saw the de-
fendant copy the work) or circumstantially. See id. In order to show circumstantial
copying, the plaintiff must prove access plus substantial similarity between the copy-
righted work and the infringing work. See id. at 192-96. The third requirement is that
the material copied be enough to constitute an unlawful appropriation. This element can
be satisfied through copying of a quantitatively substantial part of the work, or through
copying of a qualitatively significant part of the work-the heart of the work. See id. at
196 & n. 31. A plaintiff, therefore, could succeed in an infringement action by proving
the literal copying of a small part of a program if the copied portion was substantial in a
qualitative sense.
88. See supra note 87.
89. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1497-98 (D.
Minn. 1985).
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the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'
Although the scope of patent protection of computer software is inher-
ently limited by the nature of patent law itself, patent protection is avail-
able to the SSO of computer programs. Due to the qualitative standard
any invention must meet to be patentable, however, most computer pro-
grams will not be afforded protection. This hurdle is not, however, im-
possible to overcome.9
In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc.,92 the court upheld the patentability of a program relat-
ing to a data processing methodology for cash management accounts.93
Similarly, in In re Toma,94 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
held that a program that "translate[d] from a source natural language,
e.g., Russian, to a target natural language, e.g., English" was
patentable. 95
Programs that essentially perform mathematical algorithms are subject
to additional scrutiny, however, because formulas in general are not pat-
entable. 96 The general rule is that "[i]f the claimed invention is a mathe-
matical algorithm, it is improper subject matter for patent protection,
whereas if the claimed invention is an application of the algorithm [it
may be patentable subject matter]. 97
The patentability of computer programs, like their copyrightability, is
90. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In fact, at least one supporter of SSO protection has
implicitly endorsed this conclusion:
To deny all protection of structure would theoretically reduce the incentives to
create new, innovative structures. This reduction would, however, be small, be-
cause the desire for efficient implementations of program functions is a powerful
incentive to create new structures.
Note, supra note 13, at 896.
91. Sea e.g., Smith, Patenting Computer-Related Inventions, 1 Software LJ. 33, 34,
38-44 (1985)(discussing various types of computer programs and instructing the reader as
to the best method for patenting them).
92. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
93. See id. at 1369. The court noted that computer programs are recognized as being
patentable and must "meet the same requirements as other inventions in order to qualify
for patent protection." Id at 1366.
94. 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
95. Id. at 874.
96. The Supreme Court, in a case involving a data processing method for converting
binary-coded decimal numbers into standard binary numbers, stated:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that
would be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary
numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula involved here
has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital com-
puter, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972). See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 185-93 (1980)(interpreting Benson); Smith, supra note 91 (discussing the patenting of
computer software).
97. Smith, supra note 91, at 38 (emphasis omitted)(construing In re Abele, 684 F.2d
902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
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a controversial issue. 98 Even opponents of patent protection, however,
admit that computer programs are currently patentable.99 Therefore, to
avoid conflicts with patent law, the SSO of computer programs should be
protected solely through patents, while the literal elements of computer
programs should continue to be protected through copyright law. This
solution will provide adequate protection for computer programs without
sacrificing the interests of patent law with regard to the underlying
hardware.
CONCLUSION
The recent trend toward extension of copyright protection to the SSO
of computer programs is flawed on several grounds. First, it rests on an
erroneous interpretation of Baker v. Selden. Second, even if this interpre-
tation is accepted, there is a clear statutory bar under Section 102(b) of
the Act. Third, even in the absence of this bar, SSO protection must be
rejected on policy grounds due to its inevitable encroachment on patent
law with respect to "embedded" systems. The proper course is to con-
tinue to provide copyright protection to the literal elements of computer
98. It has been asserted by at least one commentator that patent law protects only
"software linked to a physical process." Note, Computer Intellectual Property and Con-
ceptual Severance, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1046, 1051 (1990)(construing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175 (1980)). This assertion, however, is misleading. The holding of Diehr ap-
plies only to programs that recite mathematical algorithms. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-
93. The current approach to these types of programs is:
The method adopted by this court for analyzing mathematical algorithm-statu-
tory subject matter cases comprises a two part test: First, the claim is analyzed
to determine whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly recited.
Next, ifa mathematical algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further ana-
lyzed to determine whether the algorithm is "applied in any manner to physical
elements or process steps," and, if it is, it "passes muster under [section] 101."
In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982)(emphasis added)(citations omitted).
Thus, it appears that Diehr has had no effect upon the patentability of programs that do
not recite mathematical algorithms. If it were true that all programs must be applied to a
physical process, there would be no need for the first prong of the Pardo test.
99. In fact, one author who opposes patent protection for computer programs admits
that "[a]fter Diehr, the Patent Office ceased to resist issuing patents for computer pro-
gram-related inventions. It now only rarely rejects applications pertaining to those inven-
tions on subject matter grounds." Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L.
Rev. 1025, 1093-94 (1990). While Ms. Samuelson disagrees with the Toma and Merrill
Lynch decisions, see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text, she admits that:
Although these opinions recognize that claims for . . . "mathematical algo-
rithms" are unpatentable under Benson, they hold that claims for other kinds of
information processing algorithms are patentable because they can be carried
out by machine and have not been made unpatentable by Benson.
Id. at 1122-23 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 959, 1019-20 (1986)(supporting patent protection even for programs that
implement mathematical algorithms); Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Pro-
tection For Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1075 (1989)("[t]he Supreme
Court's 1981 decisions ...cleared the way for patent protection for computer pro-
grams"); Smith, supra note 91, at 33 (a detailed practical analysis of the patentability of
computer programs).
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programs and allow patent law to extend protection to computer pro-
gram structure.
Cary S. Kappel

